Helpful Texts

Gerd Stricker {*}

An Absurd Programme

Is the Russian Orthodoxy on the Way
to anti-Western Isolation?

From: Herder Korrespondenz, 12/2007, P. 624-629
webmaster's own, not authorized translation

In the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia hot ideological discussions were held. It is about the importance of traditional values, based on Orthodoxy. A so-called "Russian Doctrine" drafts, more or less with the blessing of the Moscow Patriarchate, the scenario of a massive Russian world empire.

For months Russia has been in the election campaign. A new Parliament, the State Duma, was elected on 2nd December; in March 2008 it is about the successor of the present president, Vladimir Putin. He has brought himself into position as candidate for the post of prime minister after he can not any more be elected president. At election meetings is always said: "This is now no ordinary election but a referendum on our national leader!" There is talk about the "threshold to a new stage in Russia's history". With Putin Russia went farther on the road to global leadership. In view of the end of the Putin era fears are systematically stirred up: Without Putin - the "national leader" - foreign domination threatened; without the "charismatic political leader" the country was going to sink into chaos again, into a national disaster. "To elect Putin means to save Russia" is an election slogan.

Aversion to the Western Lifestyle Unites Wide Circles of the Country

In the run-up to the elections a discussion on values flared up, especially initiated by conservative circles, which, to be sure, in Russia has been led already for a good while. Also the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) asks leave to speak. A sweeping critique of culture, which is directed against the Western civilization and the decadent western "way of life" supposedly depriving man of his dignity, unites wide circles of the country between the political centre and the extreme right spectrum. Time and again it is said that it was of utmost urgency to work out a canon of fundamental values and patterns of thinking, which really correspond to Russia's nature, its history, culture and spirituality.

Behind those often bombastic programs for Russia's future are often not yet overcome frustrations about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology. Not that still many citizens bemoan the communist ideology. But what hurts the pride of many citizens of Russia is the fact that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the aura of the Russian empire, which had been announced in the Soviet Union for almost 75 years as the most important, greatest, most significant ... country of the world, has vanished into thin air.

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To be citizen of that proud empire had become a part of the identity of a Soviet citizen. When after the collapse of the Soviet Union Orthodox hierarchs sometimes stated it had filled them with pride when they had the high honour to represent the Soviet Union abroad, the national pride proved to be stronger than the rejection of the atheistic ideology.

Russia's Spiritual-Moral Values are to be a Central Part of Education

The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 was for many former Soviet citizens an incredible humiliation. Abroad they were now often treated as second-class people; swankily behaving "New-Russians" strengthened the rejection there; an even abroad appearing alcoholised President Yeltsin filled Russians with shame; and Russia as supplicant in the west hurt the national pride. Hyper-inflation, mass unemployment and impoverishment of the middle class (academics, doctors, teachers) were the dramatic consequence of the dissipation of state assets and key industries to private owners.

It was then President Vladimir Putin who with his course of "tough" re-nationalization of privatized industries initiated the consolidation of public finances and who made the country solvent again with the help of petrol-dollars flowing now abundantly into the public purse. Russia is back on the road to a world power - thanks to Putin. "We must no longer be ashamed to be Russians, we are again proud of our fatherland." But Russian nationalists expect one thing from the "national leader": that he resolutely pushes back Western phenomena, such as globalization, liberalism (meant is libertinism), and other decadent phenomena (human rights, ecology, freedom of the press, genuine democratic structures), which are foreign to the Russian mentality.

The Russian Orthodox Church does not remain unmoved by the election campaign, although it all the time stresses its apolitical attitude and does not allow the clergy to stand as candidates in political elections. The most important church dignitary after the patriarch, the "foreign minister" of the Patriarchate and probably the next patriarch, Metropolitan Bishop Kirill (Gundjajev) of Smolensk, said at the beginning of November in the Great Hall of the Moscow Christ-the-Saviour-Cathedral what many Russians think and what the Putin-near press suggests to the citizens: "Russia needs a strong leader"; the metropolitan bishop described Putin as guarantor of stability in Russia. "The election campaign shows it clearly: There is only one factor that guarantees continuity: That is the charisma of our political leader."

In the Moscow Patriarchate too the "national idea" is an explosive topic: the idea of Russianness, and the role of the Church. Metropolitan Bishop Kirill said in his lecture: As long as the country had no sound ideological foundation each change of power brought Russia close to a downfall. "I am deeply convinced that political stability and continuity are only possible in a state and a society where consensus about certain basic values exists." Suitable for a consensus in that context were probably only those traditional basic values that had universal validity before the revolution in Russia. It was important to communicate those traditional values to the youths in the schools. "We should clarify the central question about the place of our catalogue of values in the Russian educational system. It is clear for me: Russia's spiritual-moral values must be a central part of the general education", Metropolitan Bishop Kirill said.

For years reflections on general education have made feelings run high in post-Soviet Russia. Starting point of those discussions is the assertion that since the collapse of the Soviet Union the country was in a deep crisis of the Russian society and its culture. This became apparent inter alia by the growing decline of every moral: crime, prostitution, sexual licentiousness, pornography, drug abuse; added to it was an alarmingly declining working moral.

In addition to that with many Russians the mindless imitation of the West, particularly of American models had led to the loss of self-respect, Russian identity, and natural patriotism. "In this context crisis phenomena are often fit into (...) a widespread anti-Western discourse and associated with western liberalism and mass media" (Joachim Willems, Religionsunterricht: Grundlagen orthodoxer Kultur. In: G2W 9/2007, 13). In this context also the emotive word "globalization" is to be mentioned, against which the Russian critics of contemporary culture ["Kulturologen"] particularly fiercely polemize.

Also the non-Orthodox Youth has to become acquainted with the Culture of the Nation

In Russia already for a long time also a fierce debate has been led on the confessional, actually Orthodox education, for which already various drafts exist. On the Russian market numerous books commend themselves as teaching materials for Orthodox or Orthodox-dyed cultural instruction. The best-known and probably most controversial textbook is "Basic Principles of Orthodox Culture" by Alla V. Borodina (Textbook for Primary and Secondary Schools, Moscow, various editions).

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The Orthodox orientation of such a cultural instruction was essential, because Orthodoxy had moulded and formed the Russian culture for 1000 years; that's just the way things are, Orthodoxy was the "religion forming state and culture" in Russia. Youth had again to learn to identify with Russia and its culture. Only by such an instruction the next generations could become again real Russian patriots.

Metropolitan Bishop Kirill Presents the "Russian Doctrine"

In that context it is contentious to what extent it is allowed to compulsory give such an Orthodox religious instruction in the whole of Russia, after all, by a long way not all citizens of Russia are Orthodox. The Orthodox side counters that also the non-Orthodox youths were to acquaint themselves with the foundations of the culture of the leading nation [Staatsvolk] that at any rate held 80 percent of the total population. In the meantime the Moscow Patriarchate officially withdrew from the demand for a compulsory instruction to that of an optional instruction "Foundations of Orthodox Culture".

In an open letter to President Putin in July 2007 ten members of the Russian Academy of Sciences (including two Nobel Prize Winners) had protested against Orthodox religious instruction in public schools. They warned about a "clericalization of the Russian society" and reminded that in the Russian Constitution Russia is defined as a secular state where church and state are separated. Admittedly, Patriarch Alexij II labelled that open letter as "echo of the atheistic propaganda from the past", but Putin was forced to take a stand at last: On 13 September he stated: "Our Constitution establishes that the church is separated from the state. You know what I think of the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, it is completely clear: If we (in terms of religious instruction, G.S.) wanted to act differently (from the principle of separation of church and state, G.S.), then we had to change the Constitution. But I believe that is not necessary now."

The hot debate about the school subject "Foundations of the Orthodox Culture", which by the way in some administrative "objects" (roughly corresponding to the federal states [Bundesländer] in Germany) has already been introduced as optional subject, was suddenly repressed by a dispute on the so-called "Russian Doctrine" ("russkaja doktrina "), which since this fall dominates the ideological discussions about the future of Russia and its moral values.

This doctrine claims "to be a strategic programme for Russia as it should be and must be". It was worked out by about 70 authors who, it is true though, have as experts in such matters so far not distinguished themselves. The authors worked out the whole opus in the year 2005 within a few months; with a size of 800-900 pages the question arises how serious such a work can be at all.

As reason for their work on the "Doctrine" the authors give an awareness in Russia changing to a conservative attitude, which promised a much greater interest of the public in a work about the foundations of a future Russia.

In the country similar studies circulate in which ideas about Russia's necessary way into the future are explained. But their inflationary appearance prevents that the individual ones gain national importance. Thus, fortunately most of those pamphlets, which are shaped by a Russian hyper-nationalism that often looks pubertal, become not even known.

The situation is different now with the "Russian" doctrine. The team of sponsors and authors succeeded in getting the Metropolitan Bishop Kirill of Smolensk, the second man in the Moscow Patriarchate interested in it. On 20 August this year he personally presented the "Russian Doctrine" to the public. Also the place of the representation had a strong knock-on effect: Metropolitan Bishop Kirill had chosen the Moscow Daniil-Monastery, the seat of the Moscow Patriarchate, to be precise the "Office for External Church Relations", the head of which he is, as is well known. If the most promising candidate for the Patriarchate at that place so firmly supports the opus, it can be assumed that the ROC is behind it, at least that leading circles of the church identify with that document.

The "World Council of Russian People" has become a Major Political Platform

The "doctrine" was not written in a vacuum. It can be assumed that the authors and sponsors belong to the closer milieu of the so-called "World Council of Russian People". That "World Council" was founded in the mid-nineties by National Conservatives with the participation of the Russian Church. From humble beginnings it developed to the influential conservative-patriotic platform close to the state. In the meantime representatives of the state, of parties, economy, science and culture as well as of the "traditional" religious communities in Russia (Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism) use the "World Council" as very practical, welcome platform: for seemingly casual conversation, but also for binding agreements - without having to be prepared for reproaches of mixing religion and politics.

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President of the "World Council" is at present Patriarch Alexij II, as one of his deputies and the real engine of the "World Council" figures again "Foreign Minister" Metropolitan Bishop Kirill. This shows what high standing the Patriarchate attaches to the "World Council". Its annual conference always begins with the national anthem and prayer; in December 2001 President Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Alexij II personally opened it with a magnificent ceremony. All who agitate in this environment are clearly Putin's loyal partisans. And the driving force of the "World Council" is the Moscow Patriarchate with its agile "Foreign Minister".

A Eurasian Defensive Front against the West

In the "Russian Doctrine" it is quite essentially about the question how Russia can be changed "from a secular into a religious state"; meant is of course a state coined by the Orthodox Church. That "Russian Doctrine", which is so demonstratively supported by the Moscow Patriarchate, gives new reason to ask whether one was all the same ultimately striving for a clericalization of Russia in the sense of the Orthodox Church . The Opus is vehemently against Western influences, against "internationalist and cosmopolitan tendencies", against democracy and any form of globalization, and declares itself in favour of Russia's isolation resp. "easternization" ["Veröstlichung"] within the bounds of Asia.

The keyword "Eurasian" is found (not only) in the economic context; also with regard to the repulsion of the West the cooperation with Islam is propagated. One also insinuates that the "Russian Doctrine" has an anti-Semitic tendency, because among the "traditional" religions in Russia only Orthodoxy, Islam and Buddhism are mentioned, but never Judaism. While reading that opus one is sometimes beset with unpleasant associations of blood and soil fantasies of National Socialist and Stalinist ideologues.

This doctrine was no election campaign- or party programme but wanted to be a "Project for Russia's Further Development" uniting all those who have the interest of the fatherland at heart, the preamble says. Russia gave the necessary stability to the world architecture, was the centre of balance of the world; broke Russia away from the world construction, then it began to totter, as we have already seen. Thus the preservation of a strong Russia served the whole world.

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The Doctrine was a forum for the broad coalition of patriotic forces. "If fate had willed that liberal paradigms and a liberal world order globally triumphed, that had meant the end of history - the degradation of mankind." There is constantly talk about the Russians' "spiritual sovereignty"; with it always a sacred, spiritual dimension resonates in the Russian term "duchovnyj"/"spiritual" dominating the document. "In view of the challenges of the time we can - on the basis of our spiritual sovereignty and our intellectual traditions - creatively transform our programme of civilization and formulate our 'Russian Global Project'. (...) The crisis of the Anglo-Saxon project raises the question of a new world leader. Again the history asks for the integrating potential of the Russian civilization." In order to ensure that potential "a large-scale program of conservative changes" was to be drafted; further there is talk about "dynamic conservatism". In general, "conservatism" and "mental/spiritual" are terms that run through the entire text.

Cooperation with the Islamic World, India, China and Japan

In a further chapter on "Spiritual Nation" is by way of introduction said: "The nation is history's field of force." Then the "Russian nationalism was of a quite special quality - not the 'Nation' as such is precious but its national tradition. (...) Russia created the synthesis of spiritual-political empire and inter-denominational supra-state long since awaited by history. (...) These incomparable characteristics of Russia - the Third Rome - are an inspiring model in view of the impending conflict of the traditional values (advanced culture and civilization) with the "new paganism 'of the West and the new 'barbarism' of the South."

The "Russian Nation" merged other tribes and peoples into a Russian Supra-Nation, Russia became a supra-national state. The "tolerance" of the Russians that made possible this merging is contemptuously confronted "with the 'tolerance' preached by the striving for enlightenment West.

In the section on the "Russian Spirit" Orthodoxy is at the centre. There is frankly said: " Basic condition for Russia's rebirth and future strength is the alliance of the state with the church and an as close as possible connection of the church with society." The church is to take over" social, political and cultural tasks." What was needed was a national campaign with the goal "to declare Orthodoxy the source of the highest potential of the entire nation", what meant the passing on of the traditional values, but not of any abstract ones. "Orthodoxy is identical with the entire tradition of Russia as nation-state." It is a "main pillar of national identity". "Loyalty to Orthodoxy is loyalty to the (Russian, G.S.) nation."

Against this background "the Russian nation must have the right to change the secular into a denominational form of government." Religious instruction must become a compulsory subject and official holidays must be celebrated according to the Orthodox (Julian) Calendar. Then the traditional religions in Russia, Orthodoxy, Islam and Buddhism as public corporations are to become preferential partners of the state. In general, it was about Russia's reorientation from the west to the east in terms of cooperation with the Islamic World, with India, China and Japan. Elsewhere it is said that "Russia must initiate a geopolitical project in Eurasia - the alliance Beijing-Delhi-Tehran."

In the section "The Russian State" the ideal of western democracy is rejected; it was "absurd" in Russia. Democratic processes should be allowed only on the lowest strategic level. The state network and the church structures should co-operate. It was essential to develop further the Russian state to an "empire"; a "national autocracy" was going to secure Russia's "spiritual sovereignty" and its international independence. "The current Russian élite is cowardly and cheeky and fundamentally incapable of exercising the functions of the leadership of a sovereign empire." The term "Russian" had again to become a privilege in the world.

Regarding the (question of the) future "Russian economy" inter alia the "Eurasian Model" is developed further: In the 21st century the Pacific Ocean as centre of the world economy was going to be replaced by Eurasia, with Russia as driving force. "Russia becomes the world centre of the coming cognitive epoch."

Farewell to the neo-European and North American Legal Culture

A chapter entitled "Russian Socium" inter alias is about how after the disastrous, chaotic period since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which involved a geopolitical downgrading of Russia and triggered immense streams of migrants, after 15 to 20 years a consolidation and strengthening of the ethnic group of the great-Russians became absolutely necessary. From that position the solution of the social, including the migration problems had to be tackled.

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In a final section the "Paths of Reform" are shown. The legal system (one is) to be striven for "must free itself from the neo-European and North American legal culture with its principle of separation of powers and the predominance of human rights. (...) The principle of 'peoples' right to self-determination' is cancelled." The new Russia was the legal successor of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, which had never ceased to exist.

"We regard the republic as the optimal form of government, with an elected head of state that is vested with greatest possible power." A "National Security Council" was to supervise the "cleaning and healing of the state-national organism". "In a final step in the fight against parasitic stratums the transformation of the regime takes place." The conservative structures will gradually become a "Proto-State".

"The Russian intelligence" (literally: smyslokratija, about: rule of thought in the meaning of think tank) must get all means of manipulating the public opinion. "The modern myths as for instance 'international terrorism', 'global warming', 'human rights violations' (...) are unmasked and destroyed by our intelligentsia in order to make possible an alternative to the 'new world order'." That required also the establishment of a "Russian environmental standard and the crushing of the network of the 'Green" as well as of the supporters of the Kyoto Protocol."

One wonders with concern whether the Russian Orthodox Church will identify with such an abstruse, even alarming programme. Is that now only done in order to concentrate the forces supporting Putin or is now the Russian church's way into the anti-Western isolation programmed?

{*} Gerd Stricker (born in 1941) is deputy director of the Institute "G2W/Glaube in der 2. Welt" in Zurich. Areas of work: Churches and Judaism in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation; Russian Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Reformed Churches, Mennonites as well as Baptists and other Free Churches. Numerous monographs and other publications on these issues.